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SOLUTION OF
"DEFENSE OF THE GUILTY"
WILLIAM F. CAHILL, B.A., LL.B., J.C.D.
UR RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM of what Mr. Justin may or must
do in the case of Peter Beet will be clearer and more meaningful if
we begin our discussion by setting out a general statement of the moral
duties of an attorney in Mr. Justin's position.
The moralists' summarize under the four heads of knowledge,
probity, diligence and the charging of fees that are not excessive, the
duties of an attorney who is asked to represent a client. Only the first
three of these duties are referred to in the Moral Question here pro-
posed.
The attorney sins if he has not, and does not timely procure, suf-
ficient knowledge both of the law and of the facts.2 This knowledge
must be sufficient for three purposes: to guide the attorney's decision
that he will take the case or refuse it, to enable the attorney to advise
the client on his rights and the best means to secure them, and to make
it possible for the attorney to present the client's cause adequately in
court.
The attorney violates the duties of probity if he advises or under-
takes litigation which is unjust, or if he advises or uses unjust means to
further even a just cause.3
The attorney fails in his duties of diligence if he does not exercise
the care and energy without which his advice and advocacy will be in-
effective. Usually, the duty of diligence arises out of the attorney-client
* This article is reprinted from 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER 320 (Autumn, 1959).
1 See ST. ALPHONSus LIGUORI, I THEOLOGIA MORALIS §§ 218-26, at 427 (1839);
AERTNYS-DAMEN, I THEOLOGIA MORALIS § 1236, at 869 (1947); PRUMMER, HAND-
BOOK OF MORAL THEOLOGY § 289, at 133 (1957).
2 See Canon 8, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
3 See Canons 15, 16, 30, supra note 2.
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relationship established by voluntary en-
gagement. Extraordinarily, however, an at-
torney is bound by his professional status
not to refuse his advice or his advocacy in
certain cases.
Viewing the given factual statements in
Peter Beet's case in the light of these gen-
eral principles, we see that certain ques-
tions of fact are material to a judgment
that Mr. Justin should not undertake to ad-
vise or defend Peter, or that Mr. Justin
should or may do so upon certain condi-
tions.
It seems that the general statement of
the case, thus viewed, raises the following
questions of material fact:
(a) Did Peter drive the "death car"?
(b) Will Peter plead "not guilty"?
(c) At Peter's trial, will he or his
friends:
(1) offer false evidence,
(2) or offer true evidence harm-
ful to other persons?
(d) If Mr. Justin refuses to defend
Peter, will the defense have com-
petent counsel?
(e) If Mr. Justin delays until tomor-
row's hearing his decision to take
the case or to refuse it, will that
delay occasion injustice or handi-
cap the defense?
When Peter's additional statements pos-
tulated in Moral Question 4 are assumed,
the questions of fact labeled (a) and (b)
are resolved affirmatively. With this change
in the factual situation, the principle of
probity must be examined with greater pre-
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cision: will the principle permit an at-
torney to defend a person whose guilt is
not doubtful but certain, when it is also
certain that the guilty person will plead
"not guilty"?
To answer the five Moral Questions in
the order and form in which they were
proposed would require much repetition or
cross references. We prefer to offer first a
composite answer to all five Moral Ques-
tions, and then to relate the answer's sev-
eral clauses to our general statement of the
attorney's duties.
In our opinion, Mr. Justin is morally
warranted to accept the case, either before
or after Peter's new statements postulated
in Question 4, provided that the attorney
takes effective steps to prevent any offer of
false evidence for the defense. He need not
exclude offers of true evidence harmful to
other persons, if the defense's employment
of such offers is justified by proportionate
necessity.
Further, we believe that Mr. Justin is
morally warranted to refuse the case imme-
diately if other competent counsel is avail-
able to Peter.4 But if such counsel is not
available, the attorney must find justifica-
tion for his refusal.
Finally, it seems to us that if Mr. Justin
wishes to postpone his decision to accept
the case or refuse it until tomorrow's hear-
ing, he is obliged to take care that his con-
duct does not occasion injustice, or put in
jeopardy Peter's rights or his attorney's
control of the incidents of the trial.
4 See Canon 31, supra note 2.
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Peter's Case is Just and Maintainable
by Just Means
When we answer that Mr. Justin is mor-
ally warranted to accept Peter's case, even
after receiving Peter's new statements pos-
tulated by Question 4, we judge that the
case is not unjust and that Peter's not
guilty plea can be maintained by just
means.
A man who knows he is guilty of a
crime violates no moral duty when he
pleads "not guilty." A fortiori, his plea
would not be unjust if he were unsure of
his guilt. In either case, his cause is not
unjust and the attorney who undertakes it
does not sin against the duty of probity. 5
The moral position of the guilty man
who pleads "not guilty" to a criminal ac-
cusation is clearly distinguishable from
that of the defendant in. a civil suit who is
resisting a just claim. Usually, the civil
defendant is resisting claims to things of
economic value only. Usually he is morally
free to let the plaintiff have the thing he
claims; rarely, as when the statute of lim-
itations has run in his favor, does he have
a moral right to resist the plaintiff's suit.
The accused, on the other hand, by his
plea of "not guilty" is vindicating his claim
to enjoy life itself, or liberty or good repu-
tation. Normally he has not only a right,
but even a duty to make this vindication;
only rarely and exceptionally is he morally
bound not to do so.
When one pleads guilty to a serious
crime he seriously risks moral corruption
through the despair, the discouragement
and the evil associations which are the nor-
5 See Canon 5, supra note 2.
mal sequelae of conviction of crime and
of the penal discipline which follows upon
conviction. For anyone who is not well ad-
vanced toward sanctity, this risk seems so
great as to gravely jeopardize salvation it-
self. So to jeopardize one's self is immoral
unless a very grave duty binds one to as-
sume the risk.6 No man simply because he
has violated a penal law, is morally obliged
to assume that risk.
The law of our states, like the law of
most modern nations and the present
Canon Law of the Church, 7 does not oblige
the criminal to admit his guilt. Nor does
the law oblige him to accept penal disci-
pline until he has been convicted in a pro-
ceeding in which he may deny his guilt,
honestly challenge the evidence offered
against him, and claim every benefit of the
law-not the least of which is the require-
ment that the prosecution establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The law cannot put itself in the place of
God Who punishes guilt as guilt, for the
law lacks God's omniscience and omnipo-
tence. The law must find guilt before it
punishes. Yet the law must punish guilt,
not as guilt, but as a disturbance of social
order. 8 Thus it cannot use methods of de-
6 St. Alphonsus accepted as probable, and there-
fore safely followed in practice, the opinion of
theologians who said that no one who can escape
the death penalty and other severe forms of pun-
ishment by withholding his confession is morally
bound to confess, even when the law purports to
oblige him to confess. ST. ALPHONSus LIGUORI, I
THEOLOGIA MORALIS § 274, at 438 (1839).
7 See CODEX JURIS CANONICI, Can. 1743, § 1;
Can. 1744; Can. 1748; Can. 1827; Can. 1830, § 2.
8 On the relation of justice and social necessity,
as bases of society's right to punish, see 1 Ro-
BERTI. DE DELICTIS ET POENIS § 32. at 45.
termining guilt which themselves disturb
the social order and alienate from the law
the minds of free and fair-minded men.
This is the reason why the law must, in our
world, assume the entire burden of estab-
lishing criminal guilt and cast none of that
burden upon the accused.
Of course, the guilty can waive the bene-
fit of the law by confessing or pleading
guilty when charged. But neither the law of
man nor the law of God directly obliges
him to do so. The law of God requires of
the sinner repentance, reformation, repara-
tion of damage and penitential satisfaction,
but it does not require that, to accomplish
these, the sinner shall voluntarily take
upon himself human society's penal dis-
cipline.
It is only indirectly that God's law,
through the duties it imposes upon men
with respect to their neighbors, sometimes
obliges a guilty man to confess or to plead
guilty when charged with crime. When his
failure to confess or plead will certainly
harm another unjustly, or will leave the
wrongdoer a prey to harmful impulses he
cannot control, the criminal is morally
obliged to confess or to plead guilty and so
subject himself to penal discipline.
Under the facts presented, it does not
appear that Peter is a compulsive criminal.
Nor does it seem that if he pleads "not
guilty" he will become morally responsible
for another's being unjustly accused. True,
there is some ground for a suspicion that it
was Jimmy Patter who drove his sister to
her death, but the grounds seems slight.
More important the factual statement does
not show that Peter, by moral fault direct
or wanton, created or enhanced the suspi-
cion which may be directed against Jimmy.
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Peter's defense can, without injustice,
maintain that the evidence to be submitted
by the prosecution does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Peter drove the
"death car." It can point out that Patricia's
remark "License or no license, I ought to
drive us home" indicates that the girl may
well have been driving when the crash
occurred.
Clearly, it is Mr. Justin's responsibility,
if he takes the case, to use the knowledge
he has acquired as an assistant prosecutor
to estimate the likelihood that this defense
will succeed, and to decide whether Peter
may not get off with a lighter punishment
by pleading guilty. He should advise Peter
on these matters before Peter pleads at
tomorrow's hearing. 9
The Defense Must Exclude
False Evidence
Mr. Beet's plan to consult his out-of-
state friends and to enlist the "loyal co-op-
eration" of Jimmy Patter and his father
looks very much like an attempt to put
into the mouths of Peter and Jimmy false
statements tending to exculpate Peter. Mr.
Justin, if he takes Peter's case, must not
permit such statements to be offered in
court.' He cannot discharge this responsi-
bility by simply warning Peter and Jimmy
to tell only the truth. He should insist that,
as Peter's attorney, he shall be present
when Mr. Beet talks to Peter and when he
talks to Jimmy and Jimmy's father. This is
required not only by the attorney's duty to
exclude unjust means to advance a just
9 See Canon 8, supra note 2.
10 See Canons 16, 22, supra note 2.
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defense, 1 but also by his duty to save
Peter and Jimmy from the harmful effects
of such advice as Mr. Beet may offer. If he
leaves the boys to Mr. Beet, they may
evolve a story which, if it does not cause
them to be prosecuted for perjury, may at
least prejudice the jury against Peter.
Now that Peter is sure he was the driver
of the "death car" and will plead "not
guilty" to the manslaughter charge, Mr.
Justin cannot permit him to take the wit-
ness stand. Some moralists hold that an
accused person is not guilty of lying when
he, in the face of questioning by the au-
thorities, denies facts from which his guilt
could be inferred, and even makes asser-
tions which are not true, to establish an
"alibi" or to otherwise weaken the force of
evidence against him.12 This, they say, is
not lying, because the questioners have no
reasonable expectation that the accused
will tell them the truth and, they say fur-
ther, there is no lie when false statements
are made to one who does not expect or
who has no reason to expect, that the
speaker tells the truth.13 Even if this view
of lying be assumed as correct, it certainly
has no application to statements made by
a defendant in our courts. Our law, unlike
the law of many European countries, does
not permit a defendant to be questioned in
court if he refuses to be sworn, and does
11 See ST. ALPHONsUs LIGUORI, Op. cit. supra
note 1, § 226, at 428.
12 See NOLDIN AND SCHMITT, II SUMMA THEO-
LOGIAE MORALIS § 732, at 672 (1951).
13 See NOLDIN AND SCHMITT, op. cit. supra note
12, § 638, at 578; CONNELL, OUTLINES OF MORAL
THEOLOGY 158 (1953); DORZYNSKI, CATHOLIC
TEACHING ABOUT THE MORALITY OF FALSEHOOD
49-64 (1948).
not permit him to make statements in court
unless he has taken the witnesses's oath.
Once he is voluntarily sworn to "tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth," the court has every reason to ex-
pect that he shall not make any false state-
ments. Therefore he cannot, without in-
curring the moral guilt of perjury, make
such false statements as he might have
made, without moral fault, in a preliminary
investigation conducted by the police or by
the prosecutor.
The Defense May Offer True Evidence
Which is Harmful to Others
For example, Peter's defense may call
Jimmy Patter as a witness, and elicit from
him admissions tending to show that his
activities on the night of the tragedy are
not so clearly accounted for as to exclude
some probability that he, rather than Peter,
was the driver of the "death car."
This is no abuse of the truth, because
the question in issue is not the question of
who actually drove the car, but the ques-
tion of whether the evidence put in by the
prosecution proves beyond reasonable
doubt that Peter drove the car. Probity
requires that the defense attorney shall not,
in questioning the witness or in argument,
declare or suggest that Jimmy actually
drove the car, but probity does not forbid
questioning or argument to the point that
the evidence of Peter's driving is incon-
clusive.
When the defense undertakes this line in
questioning and in argument, it must fore-
see that Jimmy will be harmed thereby.
Some people may well believe that Jimmy
is lying, and the police may be led to
harass him with further questioning and
investigation; possibly they may seek to
have him indicted if Peter is acquitted.
Yet, it seems to us, the defense may mor-
ally use the questions and arguments which
have these evil indirect effects. The harm
that may come to Jimmy is not a direct
effect of the defense attorney's attack on
the prosecution's evidence, nor is it a
means used to free Peter, nor does the de-
fense intend that Jimmy be suspected or
harassed. To free Peter, the defense shows
the court that the evidence against him is
not so conclusive as to warrant his convic-
tion; this showing is made by indicating
that the evidence is patient of a reasonably
probable inference that Jimmy drove the
car. That Jimmy drove is not urged as a
certainty or as a probability so strong as
to found an indictment against Jimmy, or
even so strong as to warrant a founded
suspicion that Jimmy's denial that he drove
is a lie. These evil effects, if they follow on
the defense argument, will follow only in-
directly.
Thus, three of the four conditions which
justify an act having an indirect evil effect
are satisfied: "1. The act itself is morally
permissible. . . . 2. The evil effect is not
in the actor's intent. . . . 3. The evil effect
is not, in fact, a cause of the good ef-
fects .... "14
The remaining condition, "4. There is
just and proportionate reason for permit-
ting the evil effect. ... 15 seems also to be
satisfied if Mr. Justin conscientiously finds
that he cannot reasonably hope to make
14 See PRUMMER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 23, at
13; Cahill, Some General Criteria of Morality, 4
CATHOLIC LAWYER 51-52 (Winter 1958).
15 Ibid.
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the court see the inadequacy of the evi-
dence against Peter without bringing be-
fore it the evidence and argument which
indirectly embarrass Jimmy Patter. If the
circumstances were such that we could
seriously expect that Jimmy would be un-
justly convicted of perjury or manslaugh-
ter, we would not say that the good effect
of freeing Peter was proportionate to the
evil effect of the defense tactic. But since
probabilities here are that Jimmy will suf-
fer harm in a degree much less than Peter
would if his defense failed because his at-
torney did not attack the prosecution's
evidence in the way here proposed, we be-
lieve that there is cause, both just and pro-
portionate, for undertaking the attack
which will have an indirect evil effect upon
Jimmy Patter.
Justin May Refuse the Case If Other
Counsel is Available
An attorney, by reason of his office or
by reason of his special competence has no
moral duty to take any case offered to
him.16
If he has a duty to take a given case, the
duty will arise from previous dealing with
the client, or from the virtue of charity
which obliges us to help our fellow man in
his necessities.' 7 The duty of charity gen-
erally does not bind us to meet the neces-
sities of particular individuals, and it is
commonly discharged by help offered to
necessitous persons whom we freely choose.
Sometimes, however, our freedom to choose
the beneficiaries of our charity is limited.
Danger sometimes does more than invite
16 See Canon 31, supra note 2.
17 See PRLJMMER, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 223-24,
at 97-99.
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rescue-danger obliges rescue when the
danger is very grave and at the same time
remediable, if the circumstances indicate
that there is only one competent rescuer
certainly available, and the task of rescue
puts upon him no burden seriously dispro-
portionate to the victim's danger.
Here Peter's danger seems grave and
remediable. He is in danger of conviction
of manslaughter and his father may lead
him to commit perjury. It seems that a
competent and conscientious attorney can
save Peter from further crime and perhaps
procure at least a significant mitigation of
disgrace and punishment.
Is Mr. Justin the only competent rescuer
certainly available? Before he can answer
that question, Mr. Justin must use his in-
telligence and experience to decide another
problem. It seems to us that the conduct
of the leaders of the Green County Bar
indicates such a sensitiveness to popular
opinion that we may reasonably fear that
even when assigned by the court to the
defense they may not find in themselves the
courage and the proper single-mindedness
which the effective presentation of a de-
fense requires. The attitude of attorneys
toward unpopular clients, sometimes ex-
pressed "I will see that he gets a fair trial,
but I will not try to get him off" seems so
negative in spirit that it is not likely to
inspire that diligence which the client, the
law itself, and good morals, expect of a
defense attorney.' s
Finally, Mr. Justin must weigh for him-
self his probable cost in assuming to de-
fend Peter Beet. If it will quite probably
and seriously jeopardize his career, he has
18 See Canon 15, supra note 2.
cause proportionate to Peter's danger for
declining the invitation to rescue. We can
say only that Mr. Justin is morally bound
to use his best knowledge and a very high
degree of diligence in making that deter-
mination.
If Mr. Justin Postpones his Decision,
He Must Forestall Evil Effects of
That Postponement
Mr. Justin cannot, without injustice, per-
mit his postponement of decision to op-
erate as a connivance with Mr. Beet's proj-
ect. 19 He must either dissuade Mr. Beet
from his proposal, or insist on being pres-
ent when Mr. Beet sees Peter and Jimmy.
If Mr. Justin does neither, his postpone-
ment tends to encourage Mr. Beet to put
false evidence into the mouths of the boys.
Further, the fact that Mr. Justin will have
been in contact with the case throughout
this period is calculated to mislead the
boys, the court, and any attorney who may
later assume to defend Peter Beet.
To stay in the case, even tentatively,
while leaving Mr. Beet free to carry out his
plan, may well forestall the court's quite
reasonable suspicions that the evidence had
been tampered with. It may well cause
Peter and Jimmy to commit perjury, per-
haps without realizing the wrongfulness of
their conduct or the risks it will involve
for them. It will leave Mr. Justin and any
other attorney defending Peter in ignor-
ance of the true state of the facts, and con-
sequently liable to seriously harmful errors
in planning the defense and its presenta-
tion.
19 This discussion's moral premise is the moral
doctrine of indirect evil effects, on which see note
14, supra.
